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THE EROSION OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE
GOVERNMENT MUST FOLLOW SELF-IMPOSED
RULES
RODNEY A. SMOLLA*
INTRODUCTION

T

HE article of administrative faith that duly promulgated regulations have the force and effect of law has long been understood as
requiring allegiance to those regulations by both the public and the
government.' In recent years, however, the established tenet that an
agency is bound by its own procedural regulations has been honored
as much in the breach as in the observance. Although courts and
commentators have always recognized the legitimate need for a modicum of flexibility in holding administrators bound by their own rules,2
in the last decade the coalescence of several administrative and constitutional law doctrines has led to a new indulgence in both state and
federal agency deviations from self-imposed regulations. 3 Particularly

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, School of
Law. B.A. 1975, Yale University; J.D. 1978, Duke University. The author wishes to
thank Mr. Mark E. Gralen for his research assistance on this Article.
1. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 (1979); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695 (1974); Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 255 (1963);
United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 437-38 (1960); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S.
363, 372 (1957); United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267-68
(1954); CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 422 (1942); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v.
Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471, 474 (1937); Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,
284 U.S. 370, 386-87 (1932); Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 690, 604 P.2d
51, 54 (1979).
2. See, e.g., NLRB v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 205 F.2d 763, 764 (8th Cir. 1953);
NLRB v. Grace Co., 184 F.2d 126, 129 (8th Cir. 1950); NLRB v. J.S. Popper, Inc.,
113 F.2d 602, 603-04 (3rd Cir. 1940); E. Freund, Administrative Powers Over
Persons and Property 222 (1928); Elman, Rulemaking Procedures in the FTC s
Enforcement of the Merger Law, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 385, 385 (1964).
3. See, e.g., Olim v. Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. 1741, 1747-48 (1983); United
States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 752-57 (1979); Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435
U.S. 78, 92 n.8 (1978); American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S.
532, 538-39 (1970); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1099-1101 (7th Cir. 1982);
Atencio v. Board of Educ., 658 F.2d 774, 779 (10th Cir. 1981); Bills v. Henderson,
631 F.2d 1287, 1298-99 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Choate, 619 F.2d 21, 23
(9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980); Cofone v. Manson, 594
F.2d 934, 938-39 (2d Cir. 1979); Lyman v. United States, 500 F.2d 1394, 1396

SELF-IMPOSED AGENCY RULES

473

when an agency promulgates rules creating procedures that are consistent with but not required by the agency's statutory mandate,
courts have shown an increasing willingness to allow agencies to
disregard the rules without penalty. 4 This Article critiques the erosion
of the judicial conviction that regulations constrain regulators, and
argues that mainstream principles of constitutional and administrative law require courts to reinvigorate the precept that an agency must
follow its own rules.
Courts have used a number of devices in allowing agencies to
deviate from their own rules. On the constitutional level, they have
relied primarily on the positivist jurisprudence5 that currently governs
due process analysis to find that particular rules do not create or
protect any formal entitlements to life, liberty or property, and therefore do not trigger the protections of the due process clause. 6 This
trend has been fueled by a line of cases holding that procedural rules
themselves do not create entitlements. 7 When an agency's substantive
discretion is unfettered, for example, the Supreme Court has reasoned
that breaches of agency-adopted procedures do not violate the due
process clause because no substantive entitlement exists and the procedural rule does not create an entitlement. 8 For the most part, courts

(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974) (per curiam); Municipal Elec. Util. Ass'n v. FPC, 485
F.2d 967, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy,
495 F. Supp. 1300, 1307-08 (D. Del. 1980); Edwards v. Board of Regents, 397 F.
Supp. 822, 829-30 (W.D. Mo. 1975); Bistrickv. University of S.C., 324 F. Supp. 942,
949-50 (D.S.C. 1971).
4. See infra pt. I(C).
5. The "positivist approach" relies "exclusively on the authority of state legislative, regulatory, and judicial pronouncements, rather than on constitutional
sources." Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring Administrative Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 60, 71 n.44 (1976).
6. See, e.g., Olim v. Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. 1741, 1747 (1983) ("Hawaii's
prison regulations place no substantive limitations on official discretion and thus
create no liberty interest entitled to protection under the Due Process clause.");
Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 92 n.8 (1978) (university's rules for
evaluating medical students implicate federal administrative practice but not constitutional protections); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1100-01 (7th Cir. 1982) (state
administrative rules requiring a hearing prior to an inmate's transfer does not create
a liberty interest protected by the due process clause); Bates v. Sponberg, 547 F.2d
325, 329-30 (6th Cir. 1976) (university's disregard of self-imposed rules does not give
rise to a cause of action under the due process clause; only administrative law is
implicated).
7. Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287, 1298-99 (6th Cir. 1980); Cofone v.
Manson, 594 F.2d 934, 938 (2d Cir. 1979); see Olim v. Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. 1741,
1747-48 (1983); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1100-01 (7th Cir. 1982); Lombardo
v. Meachum, 548 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1977).
8. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 466-67 (1981); see
Olim v. Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. 1741, 1747-48 (1983); Hewitt v. Helms, 103 S. Ct.
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have not carefully considered the possibility that in certain circumstances agency procedural rules either are evidence of the existence of
an underlying substantive entitlement, or create a procedural entitlement sufficient to trigger due process protection in its own right.
On the non-constitutional level, courts have allowed agencies to
deviate from their regulations by treating certain agency rules as mere
internal guides to the channelling of discretion. 9 This characterization
avoids invoking rights or doctrines that might otherwise render departure from established rules invalid. Objections based on retroactivity,
failure to stay within the agency's statutory grant of authority, or the
"arbitrary or capricious" test of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA),10 are all more easily countered when the administrative action
on review before the court conflicts only with prior informal guidelines, rather than with pre-established agency law.
As is the case with constitutional analysis, courts employing an
administrative law approach tend to be most lenient when a rule is
characterized as procedural and the substantive scope of the agency
action is not constricted by statute. Following a loose "no harm-no
foul" version of the prejudicial error concept, a number of courts have
excused blatant agency departures from procedural rules on the
ground that the administrator's decision on the merits is beyond the
judicial pale."

864, 869-72 (1983); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 243 (1976); Meachum v.
Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57
(1974). The Supreme Court has thus made the focal point for analysis the question
whether a particular regulation creates a substantive, as opposed to a merely procedural, restraint on decision-making. See infra pt. II(A)(1).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 754 n.18 (1979); American
Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1970); Health Sys.
Agency of Okla., Inc. v. Norman, 589 F.2d 486, 489-90 (10th Cir. 1978); Lyman v.
United States, 500 F.2d 1394, 1396-97 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974); Municipal
Elec. Util. Ass'n v. FPC, 485 F.2d 967, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). Despite its potential breadth, courts in the last
three decades have been reluctant to use the "arbitrary or capricious" standard to
overturn agency action. S. Breyer & R. Stewart, Administrative Law and Regulatory
Policy 289 (1979). Nevertheless, there are occasional reversals under the standard.
See, e.g., Health Sys. Agency of Okla., Inc., v. Norman, 589 F.2d 486, 491 (10th
Cir. 1978); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 829 (1977); National Ass'n of Indep. TV Producers & Distribs. v. FCC, 516
F.2d 526, 542-43 (2d Cir. 1975); Robert E. Derecktor of Rhode Island, Inc. v.
Goldschmidt, 506 F. Supp. 1059, 1066 (D.R.I. 1980); Community Nutrition Inst. v.
Bergland, 493 F. Supp. 488, 494 (D.D.C. 1980).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 54-76.
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This new permissiveness is symptomatic of the Supreme Court's
recent trend in constitutional and administrative law toward deference to agency discretion in matters of both substance and procedure. 2 Countenancing agencies' violations of their own rules reflects
the Burger Court's apparent conviction that federal courts have neither the ability nor the mandate to aggressively police day-to-day
decisions across the administrative landscape. 13 Lower courts have
been institutionally disposed toward ungrudging acceptance of the
Supreme Court's deference. 14 These courts over the years undoubtedly
have experienced growing frustration with remands to administrative
agencies to repeat their processes by the book, because such remands
are often empty gestures that have no effect on ultimate outcomes.
Courts are understandably reluctant to add costly new layers of administrative action to what they perceive as an already over-regulated
society.
This Article attacks the new permissiveness in agency deviation
from self-imposed procedural rules. The attack is launched from an
ideological and jurisprudential perspective relatively sympathetic to
the prevailing judicial mood. Without adopting any radical interpretations of constitutional or administrative law, it is possible to construct a convincing set of rationales justifying a hardy new vigilance
by courts in striking down agency deviations from regulations.

12. See, e.g., Costle v. Pacific Legal Found., 445 U.S. 198, 214-15 (1980);
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) (per
curiam); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 524-25 (1978).
13. In Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), the Court stated:
The federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the
multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies. We
must accept the harsh fact that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable
in the day-to-day administration of our affairs. The United States Constitution cannot feasibly be construed to require federal judicial review for every
such error. In the absence of any claim that the public employer was
motivated by a desire to curtail or to penalize the exercise of an employee's
constitutionally protected rights, we must presume that official action was
regular and, if erroneous, can best be corrected in other ways. The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee against
incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions.
Id. at 349-50 (footnote omitted).
14. See, e.g., South La. Environmental Council, Inc. v. Sand, 629 F.2d 1005,
1011 (5th Cir. 1980); Swinomish Tribal Community v. FERC, 627 F.2d 499, 515-16
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. NRC, 598 F.2d 1221, 1228-29
(1st Cir. 1979).
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THE EVOLUTION AND EROSION OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT
GOVERNMENT Is BOUND BY SELF-IMPOSED RULES

An examination of the history of the doctrine that administrators
are bound by their own rules reveals three themes. First, as the
principle has evolved, the Supreme Court has moved intermittently
between constitutional and administrative law vocabulary, generally
leaving the legal source of the principle ambiguous. Second, many of
the decisions that were not decided on constitutional grounds could
have been, but the Court out of self-restraint chose instead the language of administrative practice. Third, the Court has universally and
consistently applied the principle since its inception; the softening of
the principle is a distinctly recent trend.
A. The Ambiguity of the Source of the Principle
Although the precedential support for the doctrine that an agency
must adhere to its own regulations is ample,' 5 there is no clear explication of the source of law from which the doctrine is derived. This lack
of certainty has contributed substantially to the frequency with which
the rule is disregarded. There are intimations in Supreme Court opinions that the doctrine has constitutional stature, 16 but these hints are
faint by comparison to the larger number of cases that treat the
doctrine as a subconstitutional principle of federal administrative
law. 17
Clarification of the status of the principle is important for two
reasons. First, if the principle is merely a matter of federal administrative practice, federal courts are powerless to enforce it against the

15. See infra pt. I(B).
16. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 152-53 (1945) (agency "rules are designed to protect the interests of the alien and afford him due process of law" by
providing "safeguards against essentially unfair procedures"). In United States ex rel.
Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), the Court reaffirmed the principle that
an agency must follow its own rules, id. at 266, and for the most part avoided
constitutional vocabulary. In the final sentence of the opinion, however, the Court
stated that Accardi "may still fail to convince the Board or the Attorney General, in
the exercise of their discretion, that he is entitled to suspension, but at least he will
have been afforded that due process required by the regulations in such proceedings."
Id. at 268.
17. See Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 92 n.8 (1978) (principle that
an agency must follow its own rules enunciates "principles of federal administrative
law rather than of constitutional law binding upon the States"); Vitarelli v. Seaton,
359 U.S. 535, 547 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (doctrine is a "judicially
evolved rule of administrative law").
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states. 18 A substantial number of decisions have adopted this reasoning
and accordingly have held that a state agency's failure to follow selfimposed rules does not give rise to a federal cause of action. 19 Second,
treating the doctrine as entirely non-constitutional detracts from its
force as a tool for judicial control of federal agency action.20 If the rule
is mere federal administrative common law, it is more likely to be
diffused, distinguished, or disregarded than if it is a canon of constitu-

tional law. Judge-made rules are more likely to fall victim to judgemade exceptions.
B. The Evolution of the Principle

The principle that an agency must follow its own rules traces its
genesis to the Supreme Court's 1932 decision in Arizona Grocery Co.
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway.21 The Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) was granted authority to fix maximum and minimum rates for public carriers by the Transportation Act of 1920.22 In
response to complaints by shippers that particular railroad rates were
unreasonably high, the ICC set a lower maximum rate.2 3 Five years
later, responding to further complaints, it again lowered the maxi-

mum rate and found that reparations were due shippers that had paid
the higher rate.2 4 Regarding its earlier order, the ICC stated that it

18. See B. Schwartz, Administrative Law § 5.2 (2d ed. 1984).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 188-90.
20. In Bates v. Sponberg, 547 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1976), for example, a tenured
faculty member at East Michigan University brought a § 1983 action against the
University, alleging that the University's failure to follow its own regulations prior to
his discharge was a denial of procedural due process. Id. at 326. Stressing that the
principle requiring an agency to follow its own rules was a judicially-evolved rule of
federal administrative law and not a constitutional principle, the court held that no
claim cognizable under § 1983 existed. Id. at 330-31. Similarly, in Atencio v. Board
of Educ., 658 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1981), the court held that violations of procedural
rules set forth in statutes and regulations did not create a violation of the due process
clause. Id. at 779-80. In that case, a school board failed to observe the requisite
procedures in attempting to dismiss a school superintendent. Although the court
acknowledged that the superintendent had a property interest in his job, it relied on
Bates to support the conclusion that the principle that an agency must follow its own
rules is merely a principle of federal administrative practice. Id. at 779.
21. 284 U.S. 370 (1932).
22. Id. at 385-86.
23. Id. at 381-82.
24. Id. at 382.
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had the authority to modify its previous findings and declare that a
lower rate would have been reasonable during the prior period. 25
The Supreme Court held that the ICC acted illegally in retroactively repealing its previously prescribed rate. 2 The Court stated that
when "the Commission declares a specific rate to be the reasonable
and lawful rate for the future, it speaks as the legislature, and its
pronouncement has the force of a statute." 27 A carrier is entitled to
rely upon this "legislative" declaration, and the ICC "may not in a
subsequent proceeding, acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, ignore its
own pronouncement promulgated in its quasi-legislative capacity and
retroactively repeal its own enactment."'28 This restriction does not
freeze agency action, for the ICC "could repeal the order as it affected
future action, and substitute a new rule of conduct as often as occa29
sion might require."
In an unbroken line of precedent stretching over three decades, the
Supreme Court never deviated from the principle that an agency must
follow its own rules. In fact, in many of the cases in which this
principle was tested and sustained the rules were gratuitous, the
substantive discretion of the administrator involved was on its face
completely unfettered, and the Court acknowledged that the actual
decisional outcome was probably justified. 30 Nonetheless, the Court

25. Id. at 382-83.
26. Id. at 389.
27. Id. at 386. In a footnote to this pronouncement, the Court indicated that it
might be enforcing a constitutional principle when it stated:
As a statute fixing or limiting rates to be charged by one whose business is
affected by a public interest may be declared void for violation of the due
process and equal protection clauses, . . .an order made by a commission
created by statute is subject to the like action of the courts.
Id. at 386 n.15 (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 389.
29. Id. This passage seems to assume that retroactive legislation would also be
unconstitutional. Because the ex post facto provisions of the Constitution concern
only criminal legislation, the Court subsequently has held that Congress retains
substantial freedom to alter the legal consequences of past events when only civil
legislation is at stake. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610-11 (1960); Lichter
v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 788-89 (1948). See generally Hochman, The Supreme
Court and the Constitutionalityof Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692
(1960). The Court in Arizona Grocery was thus applying due process principles to
restrain retroactive civil legislation in a manner more rigorous than the present
Supreme Court.
30. See, e.g., Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1963) (legislative
committee with complete discretion to order public testimony after hearing may not
require public testimony without hearing); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539-40
(1959) (Secretary of Interior with power to discharge employee summarily must
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emphatically insisted on rigorous adherence to the self-imposed procedural rules.
Most of the important decisions concerning agency fidelity to selfimposed rules that came after Arizona Grocery dealt with violations
of procedural rather than substantive regulations. In Bridges v.
Wixon, ' for example, certain critical evidence against an alien alleged to be affiliated with the Communist Party was admitted during
deportation proceedings in violation of regulations promulgated by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) .32 Stating that
"[t]he rules are designed to protect the interests of the alien and to
afford him due process of law, ' 33 the Court held 34
that the action of the
INS in disregarding the regulations was invalid.
Similarly, in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,35 the
petitioner Accardi had been denied a suspension of deportation by the
Board of Immigration Appeals. 36 Accardi challenged the denial,
claiming that he had been deprived of a fair hearing because prior to
the Board's decision the Attorney General had released a list of aliens
he wished to deport, including Accardi. 37 The Immigration Act delegated authority to the Attorney General to prescribe regulations gov-

erning the suspension of deportation. 38 The Attorney General had in

follow procedural regulations if discharge is based on national security grounds);
United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 261-62, 268 (1954)
(failure of Attorney General to follow procedural regulations makes deportation
order invalid even though petitioner was "[a]dmittedly deportable").
31. 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
32. Id. at 151.
33. Id. at 152.
34. Id. at 156. In Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955), the Loyalty Review
Board of the Civil Service Commission, which was empowered only "to review cases
involving persons recommended for dismissal ... by the loyalty board of any department or agency," id. at 334, acted on its own motion to dismiss a professor for
disloyalty, id. at 340. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal on the ground that
the regulations governing the Board did not permit it to review cases in which the
accused employee had been exonerated by the Loyalty Board of his department. Id.
at 342-43.
In Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957), the discharge of a foreign service officer
for disloyalty was held invalid because the Secretary of State had not followed
procedural regulations prior to dismissing the officer. Id. at 383. Although the
Secretary had statutory authority to unilaterally terminate officers of the Foreign
Service, id. at 370, State Department regulations required a hearing before the
Loyalty Security Board and a recommendation for dismissal by the Deputy Under
Secretary before dismissal, id. at 383.
35. 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
36. Id. at 261-62.
37. Id. at 264.
38. Id. at 262-63 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 155(c) (1946), repealed by Immigration and
Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 279 (1952)).
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turn delegated discretionary authority to the Board of Immigration
Appeals to consider appeals of deportation orders. 39 The Supreme
Court held that Accardi, if his allegations were true, was entitled to a
new hearing before the Board. 40 If the Attorney General's "hit list"
had the practical effect of dictating the Board's decision, the Attorney

General was guilty of pre-empting the exercise of discretion the regulation had delegated to the Board. 41 Although the Attorney General
could have retained the discretion, once by regulation he had giveth,
he could not summarily taketh away, as long as his regulation re42
mained in effect.
The principle that an agency is bound by its own rules continued its
unblemished record into the mid-1970's. 43 Perhaps its most dramatic
application was in United States v. Nixon. 44 President Nixon maintained that Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski could not seek judicial
enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum for the Watergate tapes. 45

39. Id. at 266.
40. Id. at 268.
41. See id. at 267.
42. The Court in Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959), held that an agency
employee's discharge as a security risk was illegal because the Secretary of the
Interior fired him without following prescribed procedures. Id. at 545. Although the
plaintiff could have been dismissed summarily without cause, once the Secretary
decided to proceed against him as a security risk, he was bound by self-imposed
regulations governing security-risk cases. Id. at 539-40. In a separate opinion, Justice
Frankfurter, joined by Justices Clark, Whittaker, and Stewart, wrote that "if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous
beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously
observed." Id. at 546-47 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Frankfurter described the principle as a "judicially evolved rule of administrative law," which was "firmly established," and added: "He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with that sword." Id.at 547.
Similarly, in Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963), the Supreme Court
reversed Yellin's conviction for contempt of Congress for refusing to answer questions
of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Id. at 110, 124. It held that the
Committee had failed to follow its own rules by refusing to consider Yellin's request
for an executive session to avoid exposure to adverse publicity. Id. at 121. The Court
conceded that Yellin's request might well have been denied on the merits, id., but
stated that Yellin was "at least entitled to have the Committee follow its rules and
give him consideration according to the standards it has adopted in Rule IV." Id.
43. In Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), for example, a Papago Indian couple
was denied general assistance benefits by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) because
of a provision in the BIA Manual that limited eligibility to Indians living on reservations. Id. at 204. The Supreme Court struck down the denial of benefits on the
ground that the failure of the BIA to follow its own regulations in not publishing this
requirement rendered the limitation void. Id. at 235. The Court stated: "Where the
rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own
procedures." Id. Moreover, the doctrine applies "even where the internal procedures
are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required." Id.
44. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
45. Id. at 688. See generally L. Jaworski, The Right and the Power, The Prosecution of Watergate (1976) (personal recollections of events culminating in United
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The President argued that the dispute over the tapes was a disagreement wholly within the executive branch, analogous to a dispute
between congressional committees. 46 Because the executive has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a
case, the President contended that his decision as head of the executive
47
branch as to what evidence is used in a criminal case must be final.
The Supreme Court rejected the President's argument, relying on
the rule that administrative regulations cannot be breached by administrators. 48 Congress had vested the power to conduct the criminal
litigation of the United States in the Attorney General, 49 including the
power to appoint subordinate officers to assist him.50 The Attorney
General had issued a regulation delegating authority to investigate the
Watergate events to the Special Prosecutor. 5 1 That regulation explicitly granted the Special Prosecutor the power to contest the President's
invocation of executive privilege.52 - Although the Court recognized
that it was "theoretically possible for the Attorney General to amend
or revoke the regulation defining the Special Prosecutor's authority,"
the Court held: "So long as this regulation remains in force the Executive Branch is bound by it, and indeed the United States as the
of the three branches is bound to respect and to
sovereign composed
53
enforce it."

States v. Nixon); Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1383 (1974) (analyzing
effect of United States v. Nixon on executive privilege); Freund, Foreword: On
PresidentialPrivilege, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 13 (1974) (analyzing the Supreme Court's
opinion in United States v. Nixon); Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative
Autonomy: The Nixon Case and the Impeachment Process, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 30
(1974) (discussing the impact of United States v. Nixon on relative strengths of the
legislature and the judiciary); Van Alstyne, A Politicaland ConstitutionalReview of
United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 116 (1974) (discussing political and
constitutional ramifications of United States v. Nixon) [hereinafter cited as Van
Alstyne I].
46. 418 U.S. at 692-93.
47. The argument was not frivolous; the executive branch has exclusive authority
to decide whether to prosecute a case. See Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454,
457 (1868); Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 38182 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 935 (1965).
48. 418 U.S. at 696.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1976).
50. Id. § 543.
51. 38 Fed. Reg. 30,738 (1973) (as amended by 38 Fed. Reg. 32,805 (1973)).
52. Id. at 30,739.
53. 418 U.S. at 696. Professors Jesse Choper and William Van Alstyne have
criticized this aspect of the Nixon case. Choper first expressed the view that the
principle requiring a cabinet officer to observe a regulation as long as it is in force is
not a constitutional rule, but a rule of federal administrative practice. J. Choper,
Judicial Review and the National Political Process 340-41 (1980). He suggested that
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C. The Erosion of the Principle
The erosion of the principle that an agency must follow its own
rules actually began in 1970, four years prior to United States v.
Nixon. In American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service,54 the
Supreme Court excused an ICC violation of its own procedural rules
using an analysis that presaged much of the thinking that would
ultimately prove influential in later Supreme Court cases on the issue.
In American Farm Lines, the ICC promulgated rules governing applications for granting motor carriers expedited operating authority in
certain circumstances. 55 After granting American Farm Lines' request
for such authority on the basis of an incomplete application, the ICC
was challenged by competing carriers on the ground that it improperly ignored its own rules in granting the application. 5
In an opinion by Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court held that the
ICC's deviation from its own regulations did not nullify the validity of
the grant of operating authority to American Farm Lines.5 7 Justice
Douglas reasoned that the ICC's violation did not prejudice the opposing carriers in their ability to make precise objections to American
Farm Lines' application. 58 Justice Douglas then appeared to draw a

this principle should have given way to the President's plenary power to control
prosecutions under Article II of the Constitution. Id. William Van Alstyne made a
parallel attack, arguing that a President's decisions regarding prosecution ought to befinal with regard to any interference by a federal court. If a President abuses that
authority, the proper remedy is impeachment. Van Alstyne I, supra note 45, at 13940.
Implicit in these critiques of the Nixon decision, however, is the assumption that
the regulations can be countermanded without first being withdrawn. Contrary to
Jesse Choper's view, the means chosen by the President to assert his will is important.
The difference between ordering that the regulations be withdrawn and simply
flouting them is the difference between obeying existing law, which by hypothesis is
binding even against the President of the United States, and amending the law so that
it no longer exists, a power that President Nixon concededly had. And although
William Van Alstyne is correct in asserting that what the President says is final with
regard to an exclusively executive function such as prosecution, it may still make a
difference how he says it. As between a regulation promulgated by the executive
branch that has the force and effect of law, and contrary assertions in a brief
prepared for litigation, the regulations must be controlling. Not to recognize the
distinction is to confuse the will of the President with the law that the President and
his subordinate, the Attorney General, have the legal power to establish. The Executive Branch should be judged by the public rules it sets for itself, and not by the ad
hoe positions it takes in particular disputes: "An executive agency must be rigorously
held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged." Vitarelli v.
Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 546 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (emphasis added).
54. 397 U.S. 532 (1970).
55. Id. at 533-34.
56. Id. at 535-36.
57. Id. at 538-39.
58. Id. at 538.
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distinction between substantive and procedural rules, a distinction he
phrased in terms of a comparison between rules designed to confer
benefits upon individuals, and rules that were merely internal "aids to
the exercise of the agency's independent discretion." 59 The ICC is thus
"entitled to a measure of discretion in administering its own procedural rules in such a manner as it deems necessary to resolve quickly
and correctly urgent transportation problems." 60 Justice Douglas then
described as a general principle a notion that seemed contradictory to
the general principle established by cases such as Arizona Grocery and
Accardi, stating that "[i]t is always within the discretion of a court or
an administrative agency to relax or modify its procedural rules
adopted for the orderly transaction of business before it when in a
given case the ends of justice require it." 6 ' Moreover, the government's
departure from its own rules "is not reviewable except
upon a showing
62
of substantial prejudice to the complaining party.
The somewhat cavalier indifference to the government's violation
of its own rules in American Farm Lines reappeared in two decisions
in the late 1970's. In Board of Curatorsv. Horowitz,6 3 the Court held
that a medical student was accorded full procedural due process, even
without a pre-dismissal hearing, by the existing procedures leading to
dismissal for academic deficiencies. 4 Although the main issue presented to the Horowitz Court was whether the due process clause
requires a hearing prior to dismissal on academic grounds, Horowitz
also argued, apparently without much factual support, that the University had failed to follow its own rules respecting evaluation of
medical students, and that this failure amounted to a constitutional
violation. 5 After pointing out that the record clearly showed that the
school followed its established rules,6 6 Justice Rehnquist addressed the
legal issue, stating in dictum that "both Service and Accardi v.
Shaughnessy, . . . upon which Service relied, enunciate principles of
federal administrative law rather than of constitutional law binding
upon the States. '6 7 This statement intimated for the first time that a

59. Id. at 539.
60. Id. at 538.
61. Id. at 539 (quoting NLRB v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 205 F.2d 763, 764 (8th
Cir. 1953)).
62. Id.
63. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
64. Id. at 85. The Court distinguished Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), in
which the Court had held that the due process clause required an adversarial hearing
prior to the disciplinary suspension of a state high school student, by stating that
dismissals for academic rather than disciplinary causes do not necessitate a hearing.
435 U.S. at 90.
65. 435 U.S. at 92 n.8.
66. id.
67. Id.
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majority of the Burger Court was prepared to relegate Arizona Grocery and its progeny to non-constitutional status.
8
One year after Horowitz, the Court in United States v. Caceres"
was faced with a violation by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of an
IRS rule that prohibited electronic surveillance unless prior approval
was obtained by designated officials. 69 The Court refused to exclude
from a bribery trial evidence obtained in violation of the rule. It noted
that although courts have a duty to enforce regulations when compliance with the regulation is mandated by the Constitution or federal
law, the IRS was not required to adopt any particular rules before
engaging in electronic monitoring or recording.7 0 The due process
clause was not implicated by the agency's violation of its regulations,
because the defendant could not reasonably contend that he relied on7
the regulations or that their breach had any effect on his conduct. '
Furthermore, the Court held that the APA provided no ground for
judicial enforcement of regulations by means of the exclusionary
rule. 72 This is consistent with the Supreme Court's increasing dissatis-

68. 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
69. Id. at 744-46.
70. Id. at 749-50. In a footnote, the Court did state that although the IRS was
not required by the Constitution to adopt its regulations: "It does not necessarily
follow, however, as a matter of either logic or law, that the agency had no duty to
obey them." Id. at 751 n.14. Quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974), the
Court also stated that "[w]here the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent
upon agencies to follow their own procedures. This is so even where the internal
procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required." Caceres,
440 U.S. at 751 n. 14. The footnote makes no effort to articulate how one knows that
"the rights of individuals are affected." The taxpayer-defendant Caceres surely had
as much at stake as the individuals affected by the administrative actions in Morton,
Accardi, Service, Vitarelli, and Yellin, cases that the Court cites with approval.
What the Court really seemed to be saying in Caceres was that the IRS regulations
themselves conferred no rights. The same, however, could just as easily have been
said of all the regulations in the prior cases, except those in American Farm Lines.
71. 440 U.S. at 752-53. Although it may be true that Caceres did not rely on the
regulation, it does not follow that the regulation was not promulgated for the benefit
of taxpayers. Quite to the contrary, the benefit was in the form of a governmental
decision not to engage without special approval in what the government itself obviously perceived as an unsavory form of surveillance.
72. Id. at 753-54. The Court conceded that an agency's failure to follow its own
rules may invalidate the agency's action under the APA, which requires a Court to
strike down agency action taken "without observance of procedure required by law."
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (1982). The Court noted, however, that "this [was] not an APA
case, and the remedy sought [was] not invalidation of the agency action." 440 U.S. at
754. The case instead involved the scope of the exclusionary rule in a criminal
prosecution. The Court, unwilling to extend the exclusionary rule to such cases, may
simply have been withholding one of the remedies available to Caceres for what
otherwise remained a viable cause of action. This line of analysis is unconvincing
because in this particular situation the only effective remedy is to enforce the exclusionary rule. At least in theory, Caceres appears to acknowledge that the IRS regula-
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faction with the exclusionary rule, 73 a dissatisfaction that obviously
colored the Court's analysis of the traditional proposition that an
agency must follow its own rules. In its transparent desire to reject the
application of the exclusionary rule, the Court was willing to ravage
both the constitutional and administrative law underpinnings of the
principle that regulations bind regulators.
The Court's reasoning in Caceres was a drastic retreat from its
thinking in earlier cases;74 it took the position that only agency rule
violations that independently violate the Constitution are constitutionally prohibited. This reasoning strips the principle that agencies
are bound by their regulations of all constitutional significance. If
only those rules that are constitutionally required are constitutionally
binding, the principle that an agency must follow its own rules has no
separate constitutional force.
Similarly, the Court in Caceresgreatly understated the significance
of agency violations of their own rules in terms of federal administrative law. Relying on American Farm Lines, the Court stated: "Even
as a matter of administrative law, . . . it seems clear that agencies are
not required, at the risk of invalidation of their action, to follow all of
their rules, even those properly classified as 'internal.' "75 In an illconceived application of pragmatism, the Court cautioned that stringent judicial policing of agency regulations might
deter agencies from
76
establishing protective rules in the first place.
This analysis is fraught with contradiction. The Court seems to
concede as an initial proposition that the non-surveillance rules are
desirable administrative policy. But if such rules are laudatory reforms, the Court's position that they confer no benefit on taxpayers is
indefensible. The rules promise governmental restraint in an unsavory
activity, a restraint that will be relaxed only after the substantial
bureaucratic deliberation that is entailed in requiring that the decision be made high in the chain of command. This is precisely the type
77
of self-restraint that the Court enforced in the Bridges line of cases.
Second, the Court's reasoning that beneficial administrative rules
do more good in the long run if they are not judicially enforced

tions were in a sense binding, because the IRS action could have been invalidated
pursuant to the APA.
73. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983); Florida v. Royer, 103 S.
Ct. 1319 (1983); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
74. See supra pt. I(B).
75. Caceres, 440 U.S. at 754 n.18.
76. Id. at 756. The Court stated: "In the long run, it is far better to have rules
like those contained in the IRS Manual, and to tolerate occasional erroneous administration ...than either to have no rules except those mandated by statute, or to have
them framed in a mere precatory form." Id.
77. See supra notes 31-53 and accompanying text.
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borders on the bizarre. If regulations are rigorously enforced by the
courts, the Supreme Court theorized, agencies may be tempted to
formulate them in "mere precatory form.

' 78

A judicial failure of

nerve, however, renders facially binding rules merely precatory if an
agency suffers no sanction for violating them. The Court's position
boils down to the proposition that a rule cast in language that appears
to be mandatory, but in fact is not, is somehow more socially useful
than a rule that openly states that it is non-binding and admonitory.
Certainly the Court cannot believe that bureaucrats are so naive that
they will fail to understand the significance of a judicial declaration
that agency rules are not judicially enforceable. Moreover, the citizen
is lulled into a false sense of security by protective regulations that are
in fact unenforceable. Finally, reliance issues aside, there is something
deeply disturbing about the idea that the government is free to cheat
as long as the rules selectively discarded are not constitutionally mandatory. The Court's position that it is desirable to tolerate occasional
abuses delegitimizes and undermines the idea that agency rules are a
part of the essential fabric of a society governed by the rule of law
rather than official whim and caprice.
II.

REJUVENATING THE PRINCIPLE

A. The Case for Rejuvenation
In 1983, the Supreme Court in Hewitt v. Helms79 held that a

Pennsylvania regulatory scheme setting forth procedures and substantive criteria for confining a prison inmate to administrative segregation created a substantive liberty interest that rendered the regulations
binding under the due process clause.8 0 Later in the same term, the
Court held in Olim v. Wakinekona81 that an elaborate regulatory
scheme promulgated by the State of Hawaii to govern the transfer of
its prisoners among penal institutions was not binding because it did
not create a liberty interest triggering the due process clause.82 In the
Court's view, the crucial difference was that the Hawaii regulations
were purely
procedural, while the Pennsylvania regulations were subs3
stantive.

A comparison of these cases reveals that this dichotomy cannot
withstand analysis. Before undertaking this comparison, however, it is
necessary to place these decisions against the backdrop of the Burger
Court decisions that led to this anomaly.

78. Caceres, 440 U.S. at 756.
79. 103 S. Ct. 864 (1983).

80. Id. at 871.
81. 103 S. Ct. 1741 (1983).
82. Id. at 1747-48.
83. See id. at 1747-48 & n.10.
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1. The Evolution of the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy

a. Due Process Entitlements and the Right-Privilege Distinction
In Board of Regents v. Roth, 84 the Supreme Court officially
adopted the "entitlement" approach to due process, an approach that
to a large degree resurrects the traditional right-privilege distinction.8 5
Roth, an assistant professor hired for a one-year term, challenged his
dismissal by university officials, 6 claiming he was being punished "for
certain statements critical of the University administration. 8 7 Under
the rules promulgated by the Board of Regents, the university was not
required to give a reason for its decision not to rehire an untenured
professor. 88 Roth coupled his first amendment claim with a procedural claim, asserting that the failure to give him any hearing or
reason for nonretention violated his procedural due process rights. 9
In analyzing Roth's claim, the Court conceded that Roth's re-employment prospects "were of major concern to him," a concern that
was not "insignificant." 90 The Court held, however, that Roth's subjective valuation of his job, even if objectively reasonable, was relevant only to the type of due process to which Roth was entitled if it
were first found that he was entitled to any at all. 91 "But, to determine
whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must
'92
look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake.
The range of interests protected by the due process clause is "not
infinite," but limited by the literal terms of the clause to deprivations
of life, liberty, or property.9 3 The Court then stated: "Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or under9' 4
standings that stem from an independent source such as state law."
Thus, under the entitlement doctrine individuals are entitled to the
procedural protections of the due process clause only if they can
demonstrate that a right or entitlement to an interest in life, liberty,
or property is at stake. When the interest involved is state-created, the
individual is entitled to due process only if the state has made the

84. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
85. See Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinctionin Constitutional Law: The Price of ProtestingToo Much, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 69 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Smolla I].
86. 408 U.S. at 566.
87. Id. at 568.
88. Id. at 567.
89. Id. at 568-69.
90. Id. at 570.
91. Id. at 570-71.
92. Id. (emphasis in original).
93. Id. at 569-70.
94. Id. at 577.
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interest a formally protected entitlement. Such entitlements do not
stem from the Constitution, but from state statutes or regulations.
The coldest extremes in the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence as it evolved after Roth were reached in a plurality opinion
written by Justice Rehnquist in Arnett v. Kennedy.9 5 Arnett involved
a nonprobationary federal civil service employee who was discharged,
without a pretermination hearing, by a superior whom the employee
had publicly accused of illegal conduct."" Oblivious to the rule in
Bonham's Case that no man be judge in his own cause,91 the Court
upheld the dismissal. Justice Rehnquist's opinion conceded that the
employee had a property interest in his job under the federal civil
service statute, but argued that the same statute that created the
property interest also defined its dimensions, and those dimensions
included the procedural dimensions that protect the interest.9 8
"[W]here the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined
with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in
determining the right," Justice Rehnquist wrote, the litigant "must
take the bitter with the sweet."'09
Rehnquist's version of the entitlement doctrine became a lightening
rod for criticism.1 00 The Rehnquist theory was viewed by some as
evidence that the Court's entitlement approach to due process was
fundamentally flawed since its inception in Roth. 10 1 The central notion of Roth was that the due process clause protects interests created
and defined by legislative enactments. The Rehnquist elaboration

95. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
96. Id. at 136-37.
97. 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1610); see In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955) ("[N]o man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases
where he has an interest in the outcome.").
98. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 151-52.
99. Id. at 153-54.
100. See 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 11:4 (2d ed. 1979); J. Ely,
Democracy and Distrust 19 (1980); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 10-12

(1978); Glennon, ConstitutionalLiberty and Property: Federal Common Law and
Section 1983, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 355 (1978); Michelman, Formal and Associational
Aims in ProceduralDue Process, in Due Process, Nomos XVIII 126 (J. Pennock & J.
Chapman ed. 1977); Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 Cornell L. Rev.
405 (1977); Rabin, supra note 5; Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the
Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975 S. Ct. Rev. 261 (1976); Van Alstyne,
Cracks in "The New Property"- Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative
State, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 445, 463-64 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne II].
101. See Rabin, supra note 5, at 87-88; Tushnet, supra note 100, at 261-63; Van
Alstyne II, supra note 100, at 457-66; see also J. Ely, supra note 100, at 19 (Court's
position that only entitlements are protected by the due process clause "has been a
disaster"); Glennon, supra note 100, at 359-63 (making due process protection contingent on state recognition of a substantive right "threatens to jettison the fourteenth
amendment as a significant safeguard of individual rights").
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therefore followed quite naturally-the legislature could surely decide
how much or how little of an entitlement it wished to create, adjusting the procedural protections that it built into the entitlement accordingly. But this left the fox guarding the chicken coop; virtually all
power over the due process clause, which is ostensibly a check on

legislative excess, was in the hands of the legislature.102 Congress had
brought the federal employee's job into existence and, in the same
creationist breath, had designed the process the employee was due
before his job could be taken away; as Congress had given, so could it
take. The courts had no power to interfere.

The scholarly hostility to this apparent judicial abdication led to
cries that Justice Rehnquist's Arnett theory must be undone, and to

undo Arnett it would be necessary to undo Roth.103 In place of Roth, a

"unitary" theory of due process was proposed, in which it is assumed
that some procedural protection is owing to an individual before the
government can harm him, leaving only the question of how much
process is due. 10 4 That question is never for the legislature to decide,
but is a matter of independent judicial judgment to be exercised by
courts playing their proper constitutional role as the final arbiters of

the due process clause. 10 5
Justice Rehnquist's Arnett theory also had its defenders, who saw
the whole package from Roth to Arnett as both internally logical and
externally appropriate. 0 6 This defense required the rehabilitation of

102. See Smolla I, supra note 85, at 93-94.
103. See Tushnet, supra note 100, at 261-62; see also J. Ely, supra note 100, at 19
(through the Roth doctrine, "procedural protection [has] been steadily constricted
[and] the Court has made itself look quite silly in the process"); Rabin, supra note 5,
at 87-88 (Roth "was an unfortunate step").
104. Although the Supreme Court has not followed the unitary analysis, it has
adopted a cost-benefit approach to determine how much process is due once it is
determined that an entitlement exists. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 33235 (1976). For a criticism of this cost-benefit balancing, see Mashaw, The Supreme

Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudiction in Mathews v.

Eldridge: Three Factorsin Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 28
(1976).
105. Professor William Van Alstyne has quite eloquently captured this idea by
proposing that we treat freedom from arbitrary procedure as a "substantive element
of one's liberty." Van Alstyne II, supra note 100, at 487.
106. The most ardent defender has been Professor Simon. See Simon, Liberty and
Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 146
(1983). This author has also defended major elements of the entitlement approach,
but with greater reservations and limitations. Smolla I, supra note 85, at 102-20. For
other treatments generally sympathetic to the entitlement concept, see Grey, ProceduralFairnessand Substantive Rights, in Due Process, Nomos XVIII 182 (J. Pennock
& J. Chapman eds. 1977); Terrell, "Property," "Due Process," and the Distinction
Between Definition and Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 Geo. L.J. 861 (1982).
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the notorious right-privilege distinction.107 Stripped of its excesses, the
right-privilege distinction could be refitted for new use, with its name
changed to the entitlement doctrine to avoid embarrassing memories.
The worst that could be said of the right-privilege distinction of old
was that it had been wrongly invoked to defeat core constitutional
rights such as freedom of expression or freedom of religion, guarantees
that have express textual support in the Constitution. 05 Justice
Holmes was plainly wrong when he dismissed the first amendment
claim of a police officer fired for talking politics while on duty with
the epigram that "[lthe petitioner may have a constitutional right to
talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."'0 9
The freedoms of the first amendment are not so frail that governments
can automatically force their surrender as the quid pro quo for accepting a government job or any other form of public largess. 1 0 This is not
to say that curtailing the free expression of public employees is unconstitutional, but only that its validity is to be measured in each case by
what the first amendment will tolerate, not summarily permitted on
grounds that the employee "takes the employment on the terms which
are offered him.""'
This discredited use of the right-privilege distinction, however, is
not a barrier to the resurrection of the distinction in due process
analysis. Because the due process clause is limited by its terms to
deprivations of life, liberty, or property, and property and some
aspects of liberty have traditionally been regarded as springing from

107. Compare Smolla I, supra note 85 (reemergence of right-privilege distinction), with Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinctionin Constitutional Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne III].
108. The response to this improper use of the right-privilege distinction was the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, a doctrine that the Court did not repudiate
in Roth. See Smolla I, supra note 85, at 85. The doctrine essentially provides that
government must justify with compelling state interests substantive conditions on
largess that restrict the exercise of constitutional rights. For discussions of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see G. Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law 132-47 (1918); French, UnconstitutionalConditions: An Analysis, 50 Geo. L.J. 234 (1961); Hale, UnconstitutionalConditions and
Constitutional Rights, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 321 (1935); Merrill, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 879 (1929); O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions:
Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 443 (1966); Van Alstyne
III, supra note 107, at 1445-58; Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One
ConstitutionalRight on the Forfeitureof Another, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 741 (1981); Note,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1595 (1960); Comment, Another
Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 144 (1968).
109. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517
(1892).
110. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1976).
111. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 518

(1892) (Holmes, J.).
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the sovereign, the use of right-privilege analysis in due process cases
does not pose the same problems as it does in the first amendment
area. 112 Under this view, Roth and Arnett did no more than render
unto legislatures that which was rightfully theirs: the power to decide
the terms and113conditions "inextricably intertwined" with the largess
they created.
The Supreme Court since Arnett has not unequivocally adopted
either Rehnquist's pure positivism or its antithesis, the unitary theory
of the due process clause. The Court has never had the unanimity of
conviction to select the doctrinal purity of either side. The case of
Bishop v. Wood 114 illustrates the Court's dilemma. A police officer
was fired from the Marion, North Carolina police department without a hearing to determine the sufficiency of the cause for his discharge. The relevant statutes and local ordinances did not grant the
officer a right to any such hearing. 15 If the Court had rejected Justice
Rehnquist's positivism, it would have been in the position of presuming to tell the Marion authorities to handle police dismissals in a
manner very different from the manner Marion citizens had initially
contemplated. Because the unitary theory of due process gives courts
the last word on the procedures that protect a state-created interest, it
forever poses the possibility that the shape of the property or liberty
interest created by the legislature will look dramatically different once
a court is through with it. This is a serious threat to conservative
federalism, for it raises the spectre of liberal federal courts adding
layers of procedure onto locally-created forms of largess for which
procedural protections had been intentionally omitted, allowing these
courts to impose responsibility on local governments for entitlements
that were never really there.
Conversely, if the Court in Bishop accepted the positivism of Justice
Rehnquist's Arnett theory, the idea of an independent judiciary utilizing the due process clause as part of the arsenal in checking legislative
and executive excess would be overwhelmed. The judicial power to
determine how much process is due is meaningless if that power can
be obviated by the legislature's ability to include the level of procedural protection for an interest as part
of the "defining power" that
6
brings these interests into existence."

112. See Smolla I, supra note 85, at 87-88, 93-94.
113. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974); Smolla I, supra note 85, at
93-94.
114. 426 U.S. 341 (1976). For a detailed critique of Bishop, see Rabin, supra note

5.

115. 426 U.S. at 345.

116. Smolla, The Displacement of Federal Due Process Claims by State Tort
Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, 1982 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 831, 864 n.161 [hereinafter cited as Smolla II].
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The Court in Bishop apparently did accept Justice Rehnquist's
analysis, stating that the ordinance governing police dismissals may
"be construed as granting no right to continued employment but [as]
merely conditioning an employee's removal on compliance with certain specified procedures. '11 7 Yet in Vitek v. Jones," 8 the Court
seemed to reject the Arnett theory, holding that a prisoner could not
be transferred to a mental hospital without procedures more elaborate
than those established by state law. 119 Minimal requirements of due
process, the Court stated, are "a matter of federal law [and] are not
diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own
procedures that it may deem adequate
for determining the precondi20
tions to adverse official action.'1
Finally, in the Court's 1982 term it definitively disowned the Rehnquist due process analysis. In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. ,121 the
Court stated that a legislature "may not constitutionally authorize the
deprivation of [a property] interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards."' 2 2 The appropriateness of the safeguards is a federal constitutional question.1 23 To accept any other
conclusion, the Court stated, "would allow the' 2 State
to destroy at will
4
virtually any state-created property interest.'
The compromise position that the Court now seems settled on treats
the question of an entitlement's existence as legislative and administrative, while treating the question of how much process is due as judicial. But perversely, the Court has taken the position that procedural
rules can never themselves be regarded as entitlements. This position,
more than any other development in constitutional or administrative
law in the past decade, threatens to undermine the principle first
articulated in Arizona Grocery that an agency must follow its own
rules.
b. The Application of the Substance-Procedure
Theory in Olim v. Wakinekona
The result that the substance-procedure dichotomy produced in
Olim v. Wakinekona125 exposes the bankruptcy of this analysis. In
Wakinekona, a prisoner serving a life sentence without parole challenged his transfer from the Hawaii State Prison to Folsom Prison in

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

426 U.S. at 345.
445 U.S. 480 (1980).
Id. at 495-96.
Id. at 491.
455 U.S. 422 (1982).
Id. at 432 (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 490 n.6 (1980)).
Id.

124. Id.
125. 103 S. Ct. 1741 (1983).
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California.1 2 Hawaii had enacted a set of regulations governing such
transfers, defining an interstate transfer as a "grievous loss"127 and
requiring that any transfer involving a grievous loss be preceded by a
hearing before an impartial program committee established by the
prison administrator.12 8 Although the regulations did require relatively elaborate procedures at the program committee stage, the program committee's decision was not final. The committee's recommendation was forwarded to the prison administrator, who had authority
to "[a]ffirm or reverse, in whole or in part."'1 9 The regulations contained no explicit30 standards governing the exercise of the administrator's discretion.
Hawaii prison authorities transferred Wakinekona from the Hawaii
State Prison to Folsom Prison without observing the elaborate procedural scheme set forth in the regulations.131 Wakinekona filed a section 1983132 action challenging his transfer on the ground that it
violated the due process clause because the committee that made the
final transfer decision was staffed by the same persons as the committee that had initiated the transfer process. 33 Because the Hawaii
prison regulations required that an impartial committee make ultimate transfer decisions and specifically excluded from the committee
any person that had been actively involved in initiating transfer proceedings, Wakinekona argued that he had been deprived without due
process of a state-created entitlement to an impartial hearing. 34 The
Ninth Circuit upheld Wakinekona's due process claim, on the theory
that the Hawaii transfer regulations were binding on state officials

126. Id. at 1743.
127. Id. at 1743-44.
128. Id. Under the regulations the prisoner was entitled to prior notice of the
transfer hearing, and the notice had to state "what the committee will consider at the
hearing" and "any recent specific facts which may weigh significantly in the classification process." Wakinekona v. Olim, 664 F.2d 708, 711 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103
S. Ct. 1741 (1983) (quoting Rule IV of the Supplementary Rules and Regulations of
the Corrections Div., Hawaii Dep't of Social Servs. & Housing (1976)). "The prisoner
has the right to examine all relevant, nonconfidential material related to his case, a
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, a right to retain counsel and a right to
respond to the evidence presented to the committee and to offer evidence on his own
behalf." Id. The regulations further required that the committee "render a recommendation based only upon the evidence presented at the hearing to which the
individual had an opportunity to respond or any evidence which may subsequently
come to light after the formal hearing." Id.
129. Id. at 712.
130. 103 S.Ct. at 1744.
131. 664 F.2d at 711-12.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981).
133. 664 F.2d at 709.
134. Id.
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and created an entitlement to the prescribed
procedures that was
13
protected under the due process clause.

Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held in Lono v.
Ariyoshi13 6 that the Hawaii prison-transfer regulations did "not limit
the authority of the director.'

137

The regulations, therefore, did not

create a liberty-interest entitlement protected under the due process
clause. 13 In light of the result in the Lono case, the State of Hawaii

petitioned for rehearing in Wakinekona, arguing that the Ninth Circuit was required to defer to the Supreme Court of Hawaii on the
interpretation of Hawaii law.139
On rehearing, the Ninth Circuit conceded that "it is of course the
sole prerogative of the highest state court to determine the meaning of
a state statute or regulation," but nonetheless held that "it is a federal
question whether the interest created by the state statute or regulation
is to be accorded protection under the fourteenth amendment.'

140

The

court distinguished Lono because Lono had merely established that
the ultimate decision-maker, the prison administrator, had unfettered
discretion in deciding whether or not to transfer a prisoner.' 4 ' The
Lono decision, the court reasoned, did "not suggest any weakening of
the preconditions required by the Regulation for the exercise of the
prison administrator's discretion.' '

m

The court added that the regula-

135. Id. The Ninth Circuit distinguished two prior Supreme Court cases, Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976), and Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976),
which had held that prison transfers do not automatically trigger the protections of
the due process clause. In Meachum, the Court had held that upon conviction a
prisoner's liberty is sufficiently extinguished to empower the State to confine him in
any of its prisons. 427 U.S. at 224. Although prisoners retain a residuum of liberty,
that residuum does not include an entitlement to incarceration in any particular
facility. Id. at 225. The Court specifically found: "Massachusetts law conferred no
right on the prisoner to remain in the prison to which he was initially assigned,
defeasible only upon proof of specific acts of misconduct." Id. at 226. In Montanye,
the Court similarly stated that under New York law a prisoner "had no right to
remain at any particular prison facility and no justifiable expectation that he would
not be transferred unless found guilty of misconduct." 427 U.S. at 243.
Hawaii, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, did what Massachusetts and New York had
failed to do: It created a due process entitlement by promulgating rules that set forth
specified procedures before any transfer of a prisoner involving a "grievous loss," and
had then explicitly defined interstate transfers as a "grievous loss." 664 F.2d at 711.
Because Hawaii did not follow its self-imposed procedures prior to transferring
Wakinekona, his due process rights were violated.
136. 621 P.2d 976 (Hawaii 1981).
137. Id. at 980.
138. Id. at 981.
139. Wakinekona v. Olim, 664 F.2d 708, 714-15 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S.Ct.
1741 (1983).
140. Id. at 714.
141. Id. at 715.
142. Id.

1984]

SELF-IMPOSEDAGENCY RULES

tions governing the program committee processes themselves established a liberty interest, and stated: "On that federal question,
we
' 43
respectfully disagree with the Supreme Court of Hawaii.'
The Lono decision doomed the Ninth Circuit's decision in the
United States Supreme Court. In light of the Court's steady devaluation of the principle that the government must follow its own rules,
and its parallel movement toward an ever-constricting view of the
scope of the due process clause, there was little doubt as to the
outcome of a battle over the binding effect of state prisoner transfer
rules waged between a federal court of appeals and a state supreme
court. The Supreme Court held that Wakinekona's transfer from
Hawaii to California did44not implicate any liberty interest inherent in
the due process clause. 1
Wakinekona also argued before the Court that an interstate transfer
involved hardships qualitatively more severe than intrastate transfers,
and therefore came within the residuum of liberty that a prisoner
maintains even after conviction.' 45 In support of this argument, Wakinekona invoked Vitek v. Jones, 46 which held that the transfer of an
inmate from a prison to a mental hospital brought about "consequences . . . qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of [a] crime,"' ' 47 and thus was
"not within the range of conditions of confinement to which a prison

sentence subjects an individual.

148

The Supreme Court rejected this prong of Wakinekona's argument,' 49 closing the loophole left by its prior cases and refusing to
accept Wakinekona's reliance on Vitek. The methodology of the
Court's rejection of Wakinekona's claim is symptomatic of the positivism that now dominates the Court's approach to the due process
clause. The Court's sole basis for this rejection was that interstate
transfers are statutorily authorized by many state and federal statutes.
The existence of these statutes, the Court reasoned, makes interstate
transfers, unlike transfers to mental institutions, a part of the liberty

143. Id.
144. 103 S.Ct. at 1748.
145. Id. at 1745. This was only an issue because of a loophole left open by two
prior Supreme Court decisions that dealt only with intrastate transfers. See supra
note 135.

146. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
147. Id. at 493. The Court acknowledged that, unlike most other Hawaii state
prisoners, Wakinekona would be moved across the ocean and parted from his family
and friends indefinitely, perhaps for the rest of his life. 103 S.Ct. at 1747 n.9.
Wakinekona argued this cut-off from most of the contacts of the outside world was
analogous to the English punishment of banishment, a punishment not within the
range of confinement contemplated by his sentence. Id.
148. 445 U.S. at 493.
149. 103 S.Ct. at 1747 n.9.
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interest that is extinguished
upon conviction, rather than part of the
150
residuum that remains.
This approach replaces analysis of the quality and nature of the
harm suffered by the prisoner with a mere description of the status
quo. In effect, the Court reasoned that because interstate transfers are
commonly provided for by statute, they are not qualitatively more
egregious than intrastate transfers. This analysis would have required
the Court in Vitek to defer to the State of Nebraska's action and to
hold that transfers from a prison to a mental hospital are within the
range of confinement options open to states after conviction. Such
transfers are also common, and were in fact authorized by Nebraska
statute.151
The most troubling aspect of Wakinekona was the Court's unwillingness to see any significance in the fact that Hawaii had defined an
interstate transfer as a grievous loss, and had prescribed the procedures required before inflicting such a loss. This is an extremely
unhappy development in constitutional law, for it means that procedural rules, even if "unmistakably mandatory"1 52 in character, can
never be vested entitlements under the due process clause. This approach is egregiously short-sighted, even if one accepts the framework
embraced by the Court since Roth.
2. A Rationale for Regarding Procedural Rules as
Constitutionally Binding
There are three reasons why the Supreme Court's decision in Wakinekona that procedural rules cannot be vested entitlements should
be overruled. First, it ignores the quid pro quo that ought to be
implicit in the approach to due process now followed by the Court:
The due process clause may not require government to bind itself with
promises, but once promises are made, they must be kept. Second, it
attributes irrationality to the administrative scheme. American legislators and administrators are not, it should be presumed, in the habit
of requiring scenes like those in Franz Kafka's The Trial,'53 in which
the formalities of a trial exist in a nightmarish vacuum wherein the
issue being tried is never disclosed. Rather, substantive restraints on
administrative action are normally implicit in the creation of procedural rules, and should be relatively easy to discern. Third, the
Court's approach ignores the possibility that a legislative or administrative agency has decided to use positive law to recognize and vest
due process interests. Even if the Constitution does not require that

150.
151.
152.
153.

See id. at 1746 & n.8.
445 U.S. at 483-84 & n.2.
Hewitt v. Helms, 103 S. Ct. 864, 871 (1983).
F. Kafka, The Trial (1937).
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the government recognize the value of procedure for its own sake (that
is, for the sake of enhancing certain values involving human dignity
that inhere in fair procedure), it is nonetheless possible that the government has done so of its own volition. Interests in human dignity
expressed through procedural rights that go beyond the requirements
of the Bill of Rights should be regarded as no less capable of becoming
vested entitlements than interests of a more substantive nature.
a. Of Promises Made
It may be thought to beg the question to assert that gratuitous
procedural rules should be binding simply because they are part of the
law of the land,' 54 because the critical issue is whether purely procedural rules are law at all. If, however, procedural rules do have the
force and effect of law, it is difficult to believe that the Justices would
not agree that such rules bind the government as much as the governed. The idea that the government is free to declare through formal
legislative or administrative processes that certain procedures will be
followed, and then ignore that declaration, is outrageous to American
sensibilities. The outrage emanates from due process in its "primal
sense":155 Because administrative regulations are solemnly declared to
be law binding on the citizenry, they must be law binding on the
government.
Nothing logically separates substantive rules from procedural rules
with regard to this elemental constitutional value.' 6 To treat procedural rules as something less than binding law flies in the face of the
logical underpinnings of the Supreme Court's modern approach to the
57
due process clause. As the much maligned decision in Paul v. Davis1
made clear, most of the Justices on the Court regard liberty and
property interests protected by the due process clause as arising from
two basic sources. Some liberty interests are created by the Constitution, but those interests are limited to the enumerated guarantees in
the Bill of Rights and their penumbral fellow travelers.' 8 Outside of
that small and select constitutional grouping, all liberty and property

154. See Berger, Do Regulations Really Bind Regulators?, 62 Nw. U.L. Rev. 137,
149-50 (1967).
155. Id. at 150.
156. Id. at 144-52.
157. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Unsympathetic critiques of Paul include Monaghan,
supra note 100, at 423-29; Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90
Harv. L. Rev. 293, 324-28 (1976); Tushnet, The ConstitutionalRight to One's Good
Name: An Examination of the Scholarship of Mr. JusticeRehnquist, 64 Ky. L.J. 753
(1976); Note, Reputation, Stigma and Section 1983: The Lessons of Paul v. Davis, 30
Stan. L. Rev. 191 (1977). This author has attacked the reasoning in Paul but
defended the result. Smolla II, supra note 116, at 836-47.
158. See 424 U.S. at 710-11 & n.5.
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interests emanate from statutes or regulations. 9 The Court regards
both constitutional and subconstitutional entitlements as originating
with the sovereign. In the case of Bill of Rights entitlements, the
sovereign was the newly constituted federal government, and the
entitlement-creating words are contained in the constitutional text.
True to their positivist predispositions, a majority of the current Justices believes that these entitlements would not exist were they not
part of the text;' 60 rather, they are creatures of the constitutional
language, and would not bind the government if the language were
not there. The same is true of entitlements emanating
from the lan6
guage of statutes or administrative regulations.' '
If one accepts all of this-as the Court has-there is no room for the
arbitrary division that the Court has drawn between substantive and
procedural rules. Most of the entitlements in the Bill of Rights are
procedural, not substantive. If constitutional language vesting procedural rights is binding law without more, the same should be true of
language in statutes or administrative regulations. It is no answer to
say that statutory or administrative procedural rules are often gratuitous; to the positivist, all law is gratuitous. To the current Court, not
even the provisions of the Bill of Rights are required by a higher
law. 162 The Supreme Court, however, does not dispute the elemental
notion that federal and state sovereigns can bind themselves through
statute and regulation. 63 The division between procedural and substantive rules, therefore, proves too much. Under this analysis, even
Bill of Rights entitlements that are procedural would be mere admonitory guideposts, to be honored or not at the government's whim.
b. The Foolishness of Presuming Irrationality
In the eyes of the Supreme Court, Hewitt and Wakinekona are
distinguishable because Pennsylvania purposefully limited official discretion by the procedural rules it created, while Hawaii did not. 64
Pennsylvania set up its procedural scheme to determine whether a
particular prisoner should be segregated because the prisoner needed
"control" or posed a threat of "serious disturbance."' 65 By contrast, if
we are to believe the Supreme Court, the elaborate and detailed
procedures for hearings established by Hawaii were created for no

159. See id.
160. See id. at 711-12; Rabin, supra note 5, at 71-72; Shapiro, supra note 157, at
327-28.
161. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 157-61.
163. See Hewitt v. Helms, 103 S. Ct. 864, 871 (1983).
164. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. 1741, 1747-48 & n.10 (1983).
165. Hewitt v. Helms, 103 S. Ct. 864, 871 (1983).
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purpose at all. The Court is not being true to its own modernity; it has
abandoned the hard-nosed realism that it purported to adopt in Roth
and its progeny and has attributed schizophrenia to the state of Hawaii. It is clear that Hawaii's purpose in promulgating its regulations
was the same as Pennsylvania's: Every prison, every correctional system, must deal with troublemakers. The Constitution provides little
guidance about how prisons should handle such matters. Unless a
sanction implicates the cruel and unusual punishment clause, violates
some other explicit Bill of Rights guarantee, or is racially discriminatory, prisons can do as they please. Prisoners have no inherent liberty
or property interest protected by the due process clause in any particular place or mode of confinement. 166 States can, however, create such
an interest, and Hewitt stands for the proposition that once created it
cannot be taken away without due process. 6 7 To assume that a state
has not created such an interest by promulgating procedural regulations is to assume the ridiculous or the perverse: The state makes its
procedural promises out of Kafkaesque mockery for the prisoner-the
hearing will be held or not held at the administrator's whim, and if it
is held, its only purpose is to determine what the administrator's
whimsy happens to be.
In Wakinekona, the evidence was overwhelming that the administrators based their decision on the fact that they thought Wakinekona
was dangerous and needed to be sent to a facility better able to handle
him.' 68 Hawaii created its detailed procedural scheme to insure that
prisoners such as Wakinekona would not be transferred for such reasons unless the relevant facts supporting such a decision were impartially determined. Hawaii even went so far as to describe the transfer
as a grievous loss,' 6 9 mimicking the language of Supreme Court precedents1 70 and apparently assuming that the regulations would thus be
understood as creating an entitlement. Hawaii was under no obligation to create these self-restraints. '71 Nor was Pennsylvania under an
obligation to do so in Hewitt. Having once decided to hamper itself,
however, Hawaii should have been bound by its decision.

166. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215
(1976).
167. See 103 S. Ct. at 870-71.
168. Id. at 1743.
169. Id. at 1744 n.2.
170. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1979). Professor Davis has proposed that
whenever government officers "impose a grievous loss on any person, due process
requires not less than whatever procedural protection is justified by a cost-benefit
analysis." K. Davis, supra note 100, § 11:14, at 399. But see Moody v. Daggett, 429
U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976) (finding no due process violation even though "grievous loss"
occurred).
171. See supra note 135.
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This analysis is complicated by the fact that the Supreme Court of
Hawaii ultimately decided that the regulations created no entitlement. Because we are all compelled by our reverence for Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 172 to consider state supreme courts as infallible
arbiters of their own states' law, there is a natural reluctance to allow
federal courts to read entitlements into regulations when the highest
court of the state denies they exist. Roth, after all, made the existence
of an entitlement
a matter of state law when it is a state activity that is
7 3
challenged.
Nonetheless, the existence of an entitlement is never entirely a state
law question, because that would allow states to defeat the due proc-4
ess clause by resorting to the device of the "evanescent entitlement."17
Every vested entitlement-indeed, all law-is in one sense grounded
in words printed on paper. Some base requirement of fidelity to the
ordinary meaning of words is essential if the due process clause is to
have any force whatsoever, for only words can vest an entitlement.
When a state supreme court disingenuously reads one of its own state's
statutes or regulations so as to give a "now you see it, now you don't"
quality to what appears to be a straightforward
entitlement, the
175
federal courts should not follow that reading.
The deference the United States Supreme Court paid in Wakinekona to the Hawaii Supreme Court decision in Lono is misplaced. The
Lono court was deferring to the Supreme Court's prior decisions
dealing with intrastate transfers. 176 Lono essentially reasoned that
because the United States Supreme Court did not require Hawaii to
vest entitlements in prisoners, Hawaii's Supreme Court would not do
so. 177 Lono skirted the real question-whether Hawaii's administrators had created an entitlement. In light of the elaborate procedures
they created for themselves, it is inconceivable that they did not.
c. DignitaryProcess Values Embodied in Positive Law
The most demoralizing theme of Wakinekona is the Court's failure
to accept that when legislators and administrators create procedural
rules they may be choosing to vest individual rights in fair procedure
for fair procedure's sake alone. If solicitude for "process values" is the
legislative or administrative motivation behind a procedural scheme,
172. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
173. 408 U.S. at 578.
174. See Smolla II, supra note 116, at 859-62.
175. See id. The Supreme Court lived up to this responsibility in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). The Court refused to accept the Illinois
Supreme Court's interpretation of an Illinois statute, holding that the Illinois law at
issue created a property interest. Id. at 428-33; see Smolla II, supra note 116, at 859-

68.
176. Lono v. Ariyoshi, 621 P.2d 976, 979-81 (Hawaii 1981).
177. Id.
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a court should not hunt for the magic words that indicate substantive
restraints on discretion. Instead the court, confident that the regulations are intended to insure that certain values inherent in the procedures themselves be nurtured, should find that the procedures themselves are entitlements. The Supreme Court's belief that government is
not constitutionally required to adopt fair procedure for its own sake
does not mean that government is powerless to do so and to make that
procedure a vested individual entitlement.
In reaction against Roth, a rich body of scholarship has developed
identifying the values of procedure for its own sake.178 One important
value is the ventilation that procedure brings to the administrative
process, which may discourage administrative conduct motivated by
an illicit purpose.17 Under our constitutional scheme no administrative action can be undertaken with truly unfettered discretion. Even if
a prisoner can be assigned to any facility within a prison system,
prison officials are not free to give harsher assignments to prisoners
because they are Jewish or black.1 0 Binding procedures may at least
ferret out some administrative action that goes beyond discretion into
the realm of impermissible activity.' 8 '
Another process value advanced by procedural protections, even
8 2
when substantive discretion is virtually unlimited, is participation.
Citizens about to be hurt by administrative action should have at the
very least the chance to face the decision-maker and state their case.
The psychic value in being heard out is important to the citizen, even
when he is unsuccessful. Further, it may be critical to the apparent
legitimacy of the administrative scheme, even when no formal substantive entitlement is at stake. When the state treats procedure as
merely a means for the implementation of its own economic goals, the
individuals who feel the impact of that procedure also become merely
a part of the means. 183 The state ignores the individual's demand to be
treated as an end-to be given certain cathartic courtesies that preserve the individual's sense of dignity and worth.
The Supreme Court has not found these arguments persuasive, and
has rejected calls to treat freedom from arbitrary adjudicative proce-

178. See Mashaw, AdministrativeDue Process: The Questfor a Dignitary Theory,
61 B.U.L. Rev. 885 (1981); Michelman, supra note 100; Monaghan, supra note 100;
Pincoffs, Due Process, Fraternity,and A Kantian Injunction, in Due Process, Nomos
XVIII at 172 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977); Rabin, supra note 5; Van
Alstyne II, supra note 100.
179. See Michelman, supra note 100, at 127; Rabin, supra note 5.
180. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
181. See Rabin, supra note 5, at 77-79.
182. See Michelman, supra note 100.
183. Mashaw, supra note 104, at 912-16; Pincoffs, supra note 178, at 176-79.
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dures as a substantive element of one's constitutional liberty. 184 Indeed, there is an almost reactionary theme to the Court's apparent
fixation on the rejection of process values. It is as if the Court believes
that although the positivism of Roth may sometimes work harsh
results, these harsh results must be stoically accepted by judges as the
necessary consequence of an intellectually pure and neutral due process jurisprudence. The view that it is exclusively for legislatures to
create entitlements is a straightforward consequence of the Constitution's separation of powers. Resolute judges with grit, backbone, and
a sense of institutional self-control will not invade the province of the
legislature because of weak-kneed compassion. Concepts of "property" and "entitlement" are hard, neutral, and emotionless; concepts
of "revelation," "participation," and "dignity" are soft, submissive,
and passionate values that the stoic constitutionalist must resist. Property interests and liberty interests explicitly created by positive law are
objective and substantial; dignitary process values are philosophical,
subjective, and ephemeral.
In a failure of imagination, the Court has neglected to consider the
possibility that in certain cases entitlements to fair procedure for its
own sake may be precisely what the legislature or administrative
agency had in mind. To enforce those entitlements does no violence to
the Court's infatuation with positivism, for the procedural entitlements are the positive law of the state. A state would not enact
procedures that restrict administrative freedom in an area in which
the administrator's discretion remains substantively unencumbered.
Courts that refuse to enforce procedural rules against agencies must
assume some legislative or administrative motive other than the circumscription of discretion and the concomitant creation of substantive
entitlements or, in the alternative, the embodiment of process values
and the creation of procedural entitlements. The only other explanation possible is that the rules were the product of legislative or administrative blunder.

B. A Proposed Framework
The principle that an agency must follow its own regulations is
better understood not as a unified doctrine but as a two-tiered concept. Some rules, both state and federal, should be regarded as binding as a matter of federal constitutional law. Other rules should be
treated as not implicating either the Constitution or the statutory or
common law governing administrative practice. The latter rules may
be breached by a state or federal agency with impunity.
Contrary to the approach taken by the Supreme Court, virtually all
rules binding as a matter of administrative law should also be binding
184. See Van Alstyne II, supra note 100, at 487.
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under the Constitution. Constitutionally binding rules are of three
types: rules that create substantive entitlements; rules that create
procedural entitlements; and rules that implicate specific enumerated
constitutional guarantees such as the first amendment or the ex post
facto clause.
The first type creates a substantive entitlement to a liberty or
property interest. Such rules narrow the exercise of discretion when
governmental action adversely affects an individual, by allowing the
government to take the adverse action only when defined factual
situations exist. The requirement that those factual conditions exist
prior to the official action makes the rule substantive, and creates the
entitlement of the affected individual. 5 Because self-imposed rules of
this type create substantive entitlements, these rules are constitutionally binding under the due process clause.
The second type of constitutionally binding rule includes those that
mandate certain prescribed procedures but do not on their face appear to narrow substantive discretion. When administrators ignore
the procedural mechanisms established by statute or regulation in an
area in which their substantive discretion is ostensibly unhampered,
they act in a netherland of constitutional and adminstrative law.
Contrary to the Supreme Court's current view, however, procedural
rules creating entitlements should be binding under the due process
clause in precisely the same manner as rules governing substantive
entitlements. Procedural rules can themselves be entitlements, even
when the administrative official ultimately retains discretion on the
merits.
Finally, many regulations that are purely discretionary nonetheless
cannot be ignored once promulgated without violating specific federal
constitutional limitations, such as the ex post facto clause, the equal
protection clause, or a discrete Bill of Rights guarantee. The two ex
post facto clauses, 86 for example, should be regarded as restraining
the power of parole authorities to disregard rules and retroactively
increase punishments even though the parole rules were not required
by the Constitution. 187 Although these constitutional provisions are

185. See Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 466 (1981);
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488-91 (1980).
186. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
187. In Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981), the Supreme Court held that a
Florida statute that retroactively altered Florida's "good time credit" scheme violated
the ex post facto clause as applied to persons who committed crimes prior to the
statute's enactment. Federal courts faced with similar challenges to retroactive increases in Federal Parole Commission guidelines, however, usually have not found
that retroactive increases are prohibited by the ex post facto clause. These courts have
used the rationale that the Parole Guidelines are not law, and therefore are not
subject to the ex post facto clause. Instead, these courts have characterized the
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less frequently violated by the breach of a prudential rule than is the
due process clause, courts must still be alert to the possibility that in
certain circumstances the departure from a self-imposed rule may
affect these constitutional protections.
Usually, federal courts need not reach the federal constitutional
issue when a rule is binding as a matter of federal administrative law.
Rules that are constitutionally binding are also binding under federal
administrative law. Federal courts as a matter of course treat some
agency departures from rules that could have been analyzed as federal
constitutional violations simply as violations of federal administrative
common law."' This wise judicial self-restraint, reflecting the traditional admonition that a court should never reach constitutional questions if it can avoid them, 8 9 has had the unfortunate effect of distorting the approach that many federal courts take toward review of
departures by state agencies from self-imposed rules. Many courts

Guidelines as mere internal guideposts that assist the Commission in exercising its
discretion. Id. at 25-36; see Portley v. Grossman, 444 U.S. 1311, 1312-13 (Rehnquist,
Circuit Justice 1980); Stroud v. United States Parole Comm'n, 668 F.2d 843, 847 (5th
Cir. 1982); Hayward v. United States Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d 857, 862 (8th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1991 (1982); Zeidman v. United States Parole
Comm'n, 593 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1979); Rifai v. United States Parole Comm'n,
586 F.2d 695, 698-99 (9th Cir. 1978); Ruip v. United States, 555 F.2d 1331, 1335-36
(6th Cir. 1977); Wilson v. United States Parole Comm'n, 460 F. Supp. 73, 77 (D.
Minn. 1978); Richards v. Crawford, 437 F. Supp. 453, 456 (D. Conn. 1977).
These decisions reflect a general devaluation of the principle that valid regulations
have the force and effect of law and erroneously interpret the ex post facto prohibition by relying on the verbal sleight of hand implicit in characterizing the regulations
as guideposts rather than law. The better reasoning is to acknowledge that the Parole
Guidelines do have the "force and effect of law." See Pickus v. United States Bd. of
Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In the eyes of the prisoner, the
guidelines are the law controlling his fate. Particularly when dealing with criminals,
who should have the sanctity of law reinforced rather than eroded, the government
should not play fast and loose with the definition of "law" to avoid the interdictions
of the ex post facto clause. The government suffers no appreciable damage in not
retroactively applying changes in parole rules. There are some decisions that appear
at least somewhat sympathetic to this view. See United States v. Ferri, 652 F.2d 325,
328 (3rd Cir. 1981) (wooden application of changes in guidelines could violate ex post
facto clause, but finding no violation in case before court); Shepard v. Taylor, 556
F.2d 648, 654 (2d Cir. 1977) (applying ex post facto clause to youth offender parole
guidelines, but not to adult guidelines); cf. Rodriguez v. United States Parole
Comm'n, 594 F.2d 170, 176 (7th Cir. 1979) (ex post facto clause violated by change
in parole rules governing frequency of review of parole release decisions); United
States v. Tully, 521 F. Supp. 331, 336 (D.N.J. 1981) (acknowledging possible ex post
facto problems but finding no violation as applied to the particular prisoner before
the court).
188. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237-38 (1974); Yellin v. United States, 374
U.S. 109, 111 & n.1 (1963); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372 (1957); United States
ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265-68 (1954).
189. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-69 (1947); Ashwander
v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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have erroneously assumed that deviations by state agencies from their
own rules never rise to the level of a constitutional violation because
corresponding federal agency deviations usually are analyzed as violations of federal administrative law. Faced with section 1983 actions
complaining of state agency departures from their rules, these courts
have dismissed the claims for failure to state a federal question. 19 0
Rather than blindly adopting this mistaken assumption, courts
should presume that any rule binding as a matter of state law is an
entitlement requiring federal due process protection before the state
can deprive a person of its benefit. It is difficult to imagine selfimposed rules that fall short of creating or protecting constitutionally
cognizable entitlements while nonetheless partaking of sufficient formality and inducing sufficient reliance to make them binding under
provisions of state administrative law. Federal courts, therefore,
should approach with great skepticism state agency departures from
their own rules.
Lastly, some rules should be breachable by either state or federal
agencies. Neither a federal nor a state court should grant relief to any
person disadvantaged as a result of a breach of such rules. Some might
argue that there is no principled basis for acknowledging the legitimacy of breachable rules because all self-imposed regulations should
be binding in a society governed by law and not men. This absolutist
position, however, is as practically and theoretically untenable as its
antithesis that gratuitous self-imposed rules are never binding.
It is impossible to implement or to defend a requirement of unyielding adherence to every agency rule. The doctrinal purity of making
any agency statement that falls within the definition of a rule under
the APA absolutely and unequivocally binding does not eliminate the
problem of segregating the binding from the nonbinding, but only
focuses the problem on a different definitional plane. Inevitably, some
looseness in the joints would be tolerated, if by no other means than
by classifying rules that should not be binding as something other than
rules. All governmental institutions have prudential operating principles intended to bind them externally, and all have prudential operating principles of lesser importance intended only for internal use that
are not meant to create external obligations. The breach of an internal
regulation may be tolerated or not, but sanctions, if they exist, should
not be matters of public consequence. Even the most firmly-entrenched internal rule banning first-class travel on airlines, for example, should not give an individual who violated the Internal Revenue
Code grounds to challenge his conviction because the IRS auditor who
uncovered the tax fraud booked a first-class flight to pursue the investigation.

190. See cases cited supra note 3.
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CONCLUSION

Many agency rules are in the middle range on the spectrum between rules that we intuitively regard as optional and rules that we
intuitively recognize as binding. Courts in the last decade have begun
to slip toward an unacceptable permissiveness in handling cases that
fall into this middle ground. The Supreme Court, by supporting the
unfettered discretion of agencies to disregard self-imposed procedural
rules, has failed to recognize that such rules create entitlements by
virtue of the protection they provide to the public. This trend should
be reversed by treating most state and federal rules as binding under
the due process clause. A government that expects respect for the law
from its populace can do no worse than create rules-particularly
procedural rules that appear to recognize individual worth-and then
cavalierly take them away.

